Maryland Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 4

Article 7

Effect of Constitutional Ineligibility of Public
Officer upon his Official Acts - Status of Public
Officer Holdings Office Created by
Unconstitutional Statute - Kimble v. Bender

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Recommended Citation
Effect of Constitutional Ineligibility of Public Officer upon his Official Acts - Status of Public Officer Holdings Office Created by
Unconstitutional Statute - Kimble v. Bender, 2 Md. L. Rev. 371 (1938)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/7

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

KIMBLE v. BENDER
feeling that social interests require the toleration of these
restrictions, and therefore the courts have eagerly seized
upon the theoretical difference between a restraint upon
alienation and a restraint upon occupancy to justify their
conclusions.

EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL INELIGIBILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICER UPON HIS OFFICIAL ACTSSTATUS OF PUBLIC OFFICER HOLDING
OFFICE CREATED BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
Kimble v. Bender'
Defendant had been appointed a justice of the peace at
large for Allegany County pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter 153 of the Acts of 1936. At the time that this
statute was passed, he was a member of the General Assembly as Senator from Allegany County. His eligibility to
hold the office of justice of peace was challenged by mandamus proceedings on the ground, among others, that he
was ineligible to hold the same by virtue of section 17 of
Article 3 of the Maryland Constitution.2 From an order
directing the writ to issue, defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. Defendant's eligibility was dependent upon whether
the office in question was one created by the Act of 1936.
Prior statutes dealing with the appointment of justices of
the peace in Allegany County were invalid under the holding in Humphrey v. Walls.3 There was in consequence no
valid provision in existence at the time of the passage of
the Act of 1936 for the office to which defendant was appointed, and such office was therefore one created by that
Act, within the meaning of the above provision of the Constitution, although the office of justice of the peace has attained constitutional recognition and in a certain sense is
one created by the Constitution."
It was further stated that though the appointment of
defendant was unconstitutional and a nullity, his official acts
under such appointment, made under a valid act, were those
' 196 Atl. 409 (Md. 1938).
'"No Senator or Delegate, after qualifying as such, notwithstanding he
may thereafter resign, shall during the whole period of time for which he
was elected be eligible to any office which shall have been created, or the
salary or profits of which shall have been increased during such term."
169 Md. 292, 181 Atl. 735 (1935).
Cf. Levin v. Hewes, 118 Md. 624, 629, 86 Atl. 233, 240 (1912).
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of a de facto officer and consequently valid and effectual
until his title to the office should be judged insufficient. This
is the generally accepted view and is well settled in Maryland."
In view of the fact that the Court found it necessary for
its decision in the case to examine into the constitutionality
of the prior statutes dealing with the appointment of justices of the peace in Allegany County, and of the further
fact that throughout an extended period of time numerous
persons had been appointed to and had fulfilled the duties
of the offices created by such statutes, now for the first time
held to have been unconstitutional and invalid, the Court
took occasion to rule upon the status of such persons, and
the validity of their official acts. It was declared that here
also such officers had the status of de facto officers, and that
their official acts should be recognized as valid.
As stated above, it has been very generally held that the
incumbent of a de jure office, though not entitled to its occupancy through some defect in his appointment or election,
is on grounds of public policy a de facto officer whose official acts are given validity and cannot be collaterally attacked. There is, however, a sharp division of opinion
among the courts as to whether this can be true where the
office itself has never been validly created, and whether a
different rule does not prevail in the situation where an
invalid statute purports to create an office from that where
there is an invalid appointment or election to fill an office
created by an entirely valid statute.
So, in the leading and frequently quoted case of Norton
v. Shelby County,' the Supreme Court said, through Mr.
Justice Field:
"There can be no officer, either de jure or de facto,
if there be no office to fill. As the act attempting to
create the office of commissioner never became a law,
the office never came into existence. . . . The idea of an
officer implies the existence of an office which he holds.
It would be a misapplication of terms to call one an
officer who holds no office and a public office can exist
only by force of law. . . . Their (plaintiff's counsel's)
position is that a legislative act, though unconstitutional may in terms create an office, and nothing fur3Koontz v. Burgess and Commissioners of Hancock, 64 Md. 134, 20 Atl.
1039 (1885) ; Izer v. State, 77 Md. 110, 26 At. 282 (1893) ; State, use of
Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace v. Fahey, 108 Md. 533, 70 Atl.
218 (1908); Claude v. Wayson, 118 Md. 477, 84 A. 562 (1912).
6 118 U. S. 425, 30 L. Ed. 178, 6 S. Ct. 1121 (1886).
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ther than its apparent existence is necessary to give
validity to the acts of its assumed incumbent. . . It is
difficult to meet it by any argument beyond this statement: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation an
inoperative as though it had never been passed."
If, however, we accept the logic of this statement, it is
not apparent why it does not apply equally to an unconstitutional appointment to an office created by a constitutional
statute. For if an unconstitutional act, by the very fact of
its unconstitutionality, is "in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed", it should
also be true that an unconstitutional appointment, by the
very fact of its unconstitutionality, would be as inoperative
as though it had never been made.
A recent writer has this to say of the above-quoted statement of Mr. Justice Field:
"It does not purport to be an argument but is expressly put forth as a dogmatic statement, and such
it surely is. There is only one effective answer to it:
it is not true. Courts have held that unconstitutional
statutes have imposed duties, have granted rights, have
created offices, and have some operative effect. The
statement is, therefore, not an accurate statement of the
rule of law in this regard. . . . The real weakness in
this portion of the opinion of Justice Field is that it
assumes the very point to be decided. . . . This dictum,
then, is a statement of a view, not an argument."'
Possibly this does less than justice to Mr. Justice Field's
logic, which might readily be said to follow necessarily from
our entire theory of judicial review and of the power of the
courts to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional. That no court has applied this "void ab initio"
doctrine in all cases must, however, be admitted; and it is in
fact admitted by Mr. Justice Field in the same case, when
he accepts it as proper, on grounds of "policy and necessity", to give legal validity and effect to acts of public officers unconstitutionally appointed to offices created by a
valid statute.
The general acceptance of this exception to the "void ab
initio" theory is invariably justified on the ground that doc, Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute (1935) 91; and see
the general discussion of different views as to the effect of unconstitutionality in Chapter 1 of the same work.
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trinaire logic must yield to practical considerations of governmental necessity. It seems strange then that, if the
same practical considerations exist, as they well may and
frequently do, in the case of appointment to an office created by an unconstitutional statute, many courts have yet
refused to apply the de facto doctrine to that situation as
well. There is respectable and increasing authority to the
effect that the situations present essentially tihe same questions, and that the de facto rule should be equally applicable in both.'
As was well stated in State v. Poulin:9
"The de facto doctrine is exotic, and was engrafted
upon the law, as a matter of policy and necessity to
protect the interests of the public and individuals
where those interests were involved in the official acts
of persons exercising the duty of an office without being
lawful officers."
Whether the doctrine should be applied, therefore,
should depend, not upon any difference between an unconstitutional appointment to a validly created office and an
appointment to an office created by an unconstitutional
statute, but rather upon whether in either case the protection of the public interest requires giving validity to the
acts of the officer appointed.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals cannot be said
to have disapproved entirely the rule of Norton v. Shelby
County in according validity to the acts of justices appointed under invalid statutes, inasmuch as it differentiates
between the nature of the office involved in the Norton case
and that of the justice of the peace in Maryland, emphasizing the ancient origin of the latter office and its recognition
as part of our judicial system under the State Constitution.
It emphasizes also, however, that "on the facts here presented public policy required obedience from the citizens
of the provisions of these public statutes, even though unconstitutional"; and definitely states that, though the statutes creating the offices involved were invalid, the incumbents were officers de facto until the statutes were declared
unconstitutional.

8See cases cited in the opinion in the instant case, particularly State v.
Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N. W. 999 (1896); Burt v. Winona and St.
Peter R. Co., 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W. 285, 289 (1884) ; State v. Poulin, 105
Me. 224, 74 AtI. 119 (1909) ; Lang v. Mayor of Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68
Atl. 90 (1907).
'Supra, note 8; and see comment in Note (1910) 8 Mich. L. R. 229, 2.36.
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The opinion therefore, though somewhat guarded, would
seem on the whole to adopt the views of the cases refusing
to apply, as an inexorable rule, the "void ab initio" theory
when an office is created by an unconstitutional statute. In
so doing, it is submitted that the Court has followed the
sounder line of authority. 10
THE SEAL AS CONSIDERATION ON A
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
Citizen's Nat. Bank of Pocomoke City v. Custis'
Plaintiff, the payee of a sealed instrument, brought this
action against the defendant bank, the executor of John
T. M. Sturgis, maker of the instrument. The pleader
declared on it as upon a bill obligatory "payable to the
said Bertha D. Custis on demand". The writing proved
to possess all the requirements of negotiability as specified in Art. 13, Sec. 20. The trial court treated the instrument as a specialty and maintained that the seal precluded
a defense on the ground of absence of consideration, and
a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. On appeal, Held:
Reversed and new trial awarded. Since the instrument
was in writing signed by the maker, and contained an unconditional promise to pay to the order of the appellee
a sum certain in money on demand,2 it was a valid and
negotiable promissory note despite the presence of the
seal.3 That the Negotiable Instruments Act4 was within
the contemplation of the parties and was anticipated in
the formation and execution of the instrument could be
inferred from the provision wherein the "maker and endorser" engaged to waive demand, protest and notice of
non-payment.5 The position taken by the trial court was
prejudicial to the appellant as it had apparently accepted
the appellee's argument that, even though without consideration, the instrument was enforceable as a gift. The
Court gave the following clear statement of the Maryland
law as to the effect of a seal as consideration on a negotiable instrument:
" For a penetrating analysis of the question in various aspects, see Field
op. cit supra note 7. particularly Chapter IV.
1 153 Md. 235. 138 Atl. 261, 53 A. L. R. 1165 (1927).
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